"An Unjustifiably High Number of Judges in the Republic of Bulgaria" – Reality or Perception?

Eurostat recently published data showing that, in 2024, Bulgaria ranked fourth in the European Union (EU) in terms of the number of judges per capita (35.4 judges per 100,000 inhabitants)[1]. The statistics reveal that Croatia and Slovenia hold the top two spots, with 43.3 and 40.2 judges per 100,000 inhabitants respectively, followed by Luxembourg with 36.0 judges per 100,000 inhabitants. Various media outlets and non-governmental organizations have interpreted these data as an indication that the number of judges in Bulgaria is excessive; this has sparked a discussion regarding the need for various staffing and financial measures within the judiciary.

The findings regarding the excessive number of judges in Bulgaria are based on data published on the Eurostat website. In this context, it is important to note that Eurostat is the statistical office of the European Commission, responsible for conducting comparative analyses across EU Member States based on specific indicators. However, it should be pointed out that the comparison made by Eurostat relies on a single indicator: the number of judges per capita. Relying solely on this indicator is insufficient to substantiate the claim that the number of judges is excessive. To conduct an accurate and objective analysis and comparison among Member States—one capable of leading to the conclusion that the number of judges in certain states is excessive—multiple factors must be taken into account; examining the ratio of judges per capita is merely one of them. In this context, a key factor to consider is the caseload (the number of cases pending adjudication) relative to the number of judges. Consequently, to ensure the completeness and accuracy of the comparative analysis across Member States, it is necessary to examine a range of factors that manifest differently in each EU country; a comprehensive analysis of these factors allows for an objective conclusion as to whether the number of judges is excessive, sufficient, or inadequate in relation to the population's needs.

Although Bulgaria ranks among the top EU countries in terms of the number of judges per capita, it also ranks among the highest in terms of the caseload handled by individual judges. According to the consolidated statistical tables on court activity for 2025[2], the number of cases filed with the courts is steadily increasing (a notable example being the significant rise in civil cases under general procedure heard by regional courts in district centers—103,515 in 2025 compared to 98,820 in 2023). Data published on the website of the Supreme Administrative Court indicates that the total number of cases concluded across the country's 28 administrative courts was 43,337—an increase of 3,104 cases (or 7.72%) compared to the previous year. This trend is primarily attributable to three sets of circumstances: the absence of cases handled by non-judicial bodies; an inadequate state response regarding various legal relationships—which inevitably impacts the judiciary's workload; and the ever-increasing number of proceedings assigned to the courts for adjudication.

I. In a number of EU Member States, certain types of proceedings are assigned to non-judicial bodies for resolution. Divorce by mutual consent serves as a prime example. A study conducted by the Court of Justice of the European Union, titled "Out-of-court divorce: rules, procedures and cross-border recognition in the Member States"[3], reveals that many EU Member States—including France, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Romania, and Greece—have implemented non-judicial procedures for handling divorce applications based on mutual consent. The study further suggests that the specific factual elements required to authorize a divorce via a non-judicial body vary across different European countries. However, in all Member States, an agreement between the spouses to terminate their marriage is a necessary element. Additional elements required for this procedure to take place are also observed across the various Member States, such as: a minimum duration of the marriage (Spain), the absence of minor children (Spain and Italy), and an agreement between the spouses regarding the family home (Portugal and Slovenia). Certain exceptions to allowing divorce by mutual consent under this procedure have also been introduced where it is necessary to better protect the child's interests (for instance, in France, out-of-court divorce is not permitted if the child needs to be heard by the court). The agreement reached by the spouses must be in writing, with the exception of Greece, where it is permissible for the spouses' consent to be submitted via a joint digital declaration.In most Member States that provide for the possibility of the extrajudicial dissolution of marriage, the competent authority for such proceedings is a notary (France, Greece, Latvia, and Slovenia) or a civil registrar (Italy and Portugal). Some states also assign a role to the public prosecutor in extrajudicial divorce proceedings when it is necessary to safeguard the rights and interests of children born of the marriage (as is the case in Portugal). Regarding the legal effects of such extrajudicial divorce, it should be noted that in some Member States, the act issued by the extrajudicial authority has the same legal consequences as a court judgment (Portugal and Italy), whereas in other European countries, such an act is classified as an official document that produces binding legal effects. In its analysis, the Court of Justice of the EU concluded that the procedure for the extrajudicial dissolution of marriage simplifies and accelerates the divorce process and relieves courts of a significant caseload, while not entirely precluding judicial intervention when it is necessary to protect the interests of children born of the marriage.

The foregoing analysis leads to the conclusion that a number of Member States provide for certain types of cases to be handled by extrajudicial authorities. Implementing such a procedure relieves courts of a large number of cases that do not involve significant factual or legal complexity. In light of the foregoing, and returning to the data published by Eurostat, Spain (6.2 judges per 100,000 inhabitants) and Italy (7.9 judges per 100,000 inhabitants) rank at the bottom regarding the number of judges per capita. However, it is precisely in these countries that provision is made for divorce by mutual consent to be handled by a non-judicial authority, thereby significantly easing the caseload of the courts in these Member States. Furthermore, the fact that Italy ranks high in terms of delayed proceedings—a matter noted in numerous judgments of the European Court of Human Rights (e.g., Bottazzi v. Italy[4]; Verrascina and Others v. Italy[5]; Montalto and Others v. Italy[6])—cannot be overlooked.

Against this background, consideration should be given—*de lege ferenda*—to introducing similar non-judicial bodies in Bulgaria to handle specific categories of cases, such as divorce by mutual consent and other non-contentious proceedings (e.g., renunciation and acceptance of inheritance, authorization for the disposal of a child's property, etc.), while safeguarding the public interest and the best interests of the child where necessary.

II. The second aspect to consider when analyzing the factors affecting the workload of courts in Bulgaria relates to the inadequate response from the competent executive authorities regarding the established systemic violation of legislation by certain private entities. The activities of non-bank financial institutions providing credit financing as a business serve as an example of this. Despite consistent and settled case law—both from Bulgarian courts and the Court of Justice of the European Union (following requests for preliminary rulings)—regarding the presence of unfair terms in consumer credit contracts and the use of unfair commercial practices by a significant number of financial institutions in Bulgaria, the institutional response remains insufficient. Unlawful practices must be addressed, and appropriate sanctions and regulatory measures must be implemented. In this context, mention should be made of Judgment No. 6438 of 27 May 2024, delivered by the Administrative Court – Sofia in Administrative Case No. 2851/2024, which upheld Judgment No. 784 of 14 February 2024, issued in the administrative penal case... Case No. 15313/2023 on the docket of the Sofia District Court, upholding a penal decree issued by the Acting Director of a Regional Directorate within the General Directorate "Market Control" at the Commission for Consumer Protection, pursuant to Art. 83, para. 1 of the Law on Administrative Violations and Penalties (ZANN) and Art. 232, para. 2 in conjunction with Art. ...Article 210a of the Consumer Protection Act (CPA), whereby the appellant was imposed an administrative penalty in the form of a "pecuniary sanction" amounting to BGN 2,000 (two thousand) for a violation of Article 68e, Paragraph 2, second clause, in conjunction with Article 68g, Paragraph 4, and Article 68c of the CPA. The court established that the financial institution failed to include information regarding costs associated with the credit agreement—as one of its key characteristics—in the Standard European Consumer Credit Information form; instead, the relevant section incorporated information only regarding the event triggering the penalty (failure to secure the agreement with a guarantee from a natural person) and the formula for calculating the daily-accruing penalty claim, thereby creating a genuine risk of misleading the consumer. In light of the cited ruling by the Administrative Court of Sofia City, the enforcement actions taken by the Commission for Consumer Protection upon detecting such violations by financial institutions could be expanded and applied more actively. It should be emphasized that, pursuant to Article 210a of the CPA, violations of Articles 68c, 68g, 68zh (items 1–11, 13, 15, 18–27), and 68k (items 3–6) are punishable by a fine ranging from BGN 1,000 to BGN 30,000 for the liable parties, while... sole traders and legal entities – a pecuniary sanction ranging from BGN 2,000 to BGN 50,000.At the same time, pursuant to Article 232, paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Consumer Protection Act, in cases of a violation of the Act sanctioned by a final penal decree, the supervisory authority proposes the revocation of the license and/or operating permit to the issuing authority. The authority that issued the license and/or operating permit rules on the proposal via a reasoned decision; it immediately notifies the supervisory authority referred to in paragraph 1 of the outcome, and—in the event that it revokes the issued license or permit—specifies the date and grounds for the revocation. Despite the powers granted to the Commission, there has been insufficient activity regarding the taking of measures to identify and impose sanctions for violations related to the terms (clauses) under which non-bank financial institutions provide credit financing. This, in turn, has the direct result of these financial service providers persisting in the use of contracts containing numerous unfair terms. These unfair terms are found in standardized (pre-drafted) contracts provided to consumers, leaving judicial proceedings as the sole avenue for redress. It is precisely this lack of preliminary regulation and failure to identify violations committed by financial institutions—specifically regarding the systematic imposition of unfair contract terms on consumers—that generates a significant volume of civil proceedings (both standard lawsuits and order-for-payment proceedings) requiring adjudication by the courts of the Republic of Bulgaria.

III. Proceedings entirely new to Bulgarian jurisprudence are being introduced, with the courts once again tasked with handling them in their entirety. In this context, mention should be made of the personal insolvency proceedings provided for in the newly adopted Personal Insolvency Act. Amendments to the Civil Procedure Code have also been adopted at first reading to introduce a procedure for handling so-called SLAPP cases (Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation). The conclusion to be drawn is that the legislative trend and objective observed in recent years is not to remove certain types of cases—primarily non-contentious proceedings—from the court system; on the contrary, the system is being further burdened with new categories of proceedings.

The points outlined above lead to the conclusion that, although Bulgaria ranks high in terms of the number of judges per capita, this should by no means be viewed as an indication of an excessive number of judges; the primary factor to consider is the actual caseload handled by each individual judge. There is a need to rethink the concept of the judiciary’s operations—viewing them not in isolation, but rather within the context of the judiciary's place in the state apparatus; this approach is precisely what would lead to a proper understanding of the judiciary and the identification of the most appropriate measures for its future development.

Author: Judge Lidia Georgieva,

President of the Svoge Regional Court,

Member of the Management Board of the Association of Women Judges in Bulgaria